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New Conundrums: Public Policy and
the Emerging Health Care Marketplace
James R. Tallon, Jr.
There is a fundamentally new dynamic in American health care, one
that has yet to be fully experienced but that threatens to leave a
large portion of the American population without access to the
quality health care they have received in the past. While the federal
government has not completely abandoned the goal of assuring
universal health care, a goal that dates back to the creation of
Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s and even earlier, the
mechanisms to pursue that goal have changed. The implicit contract
between government and health care providers—mostly doctors
and not-for-profit hospitals—under which subsidized care was
provided to those unable to pay has been broken in favor of more
market-driven forces that promise a more cost-effective system, but
a system that fails to protect a growing uninsured population. This
new purchaser-driven system—in which costs increasingly
determine the services that are provided—is likely to fall short of
providing quality care to all who need it.
Health care is different from other services, and unless this
difference is recognized we are in danger of permanently denying
quality health care to a significant minority of our population.
Regulation of the emerging “free market” in health care is needed
and government must assure that role.
Background
To more clearly understand where we now stand, it is necessary to
look back to 1965 when the creation of Medicare and Medicaid
brought us into the modern era of “universal” health care.Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
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The American system of financing health care has been fragmented
for three decades: Medicare for the elderly and disabled; Medicaid
for the poor; an employer-based health insurance system for the
working population and their dependents; direct expenditure and
sponsorship of services by local and state governments; and
categorical funding by the federal government for people who do
not have a direct source of financing. The implicit bargain
underlying that so-called “system” was that the providers of
care—physicians, other health care professionals, and the hospitals
in which they worked—channeled these fragmented streams of
financing to support a health care system available to the entire
population. Of course, the care was not provided on a perfectly
equitable basis. There were many deficiencies in care among
segments of the population, particularly the uninsured. But the
agreement essentially was that in return for having authority to run
the health care delivery system, physicians and hospitals undertook
the obligation to make certain that the fragmented sources of
money were translated into a safety net that more or less served
everybody.
There were many elements in that safety net: not-for-profit
hospitals; a strong not-for-profit health insurance industry led by
Blue Cross/Blue Shield; and the professional obligations that
physicians and other health professionals undertook. There was
informal cost shifting in the marketplace. Open doors were
maintained by municipal and state-operated health care systems.
There were explicit reimbursement provisions in Medicare and
Medicaid to support so-called disproportionate share hospitals, that
is, hospitals that treated larger numbers of uninsured people, where
medical residents often had the responsibility of caring for medically
indigent patients. Through all of those mechanisms, we somehow
patched together a system that provided universal, albeit imperfect,
access to health care.James R. Tallon, Jr.
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Clinton Health Care Reform and
the Purchaser Revolution
In addition to the safety net of services woven from fragmented
streams of financing, American health care had another powerful
characteristic. Between 1965 and the early 1990s, health care
expenditures grew from 8 percent to approximately 14 percent of
gross domestic product. By the time of the 1992 Presidential
election, frustration with cost growth and continued concern with
large numbers of uninsured persons pushed health care high on the
national agenda. The new Clinton administration sought to craft a
comprehensive response to both problems: a comprehensive system
of financing in which employers would be responsible for providing
health insurance coverage for their employees; government would
continue prime responsibility for the elderly, disabled, and poor; and
various cross-subsidies would ease burdens on parts of the payer
community. The result was the Clinton health plan.
President Clinton made the political bet that big business would
support comprehensive health reform. Why? Because big business
for a generation had been characterized as the victim of cost-
shifting in the American health care economy. Large businesses that
provided comprehensive health insurance were often asked to pay
more for their employees, for the patients who were covered, to
make up for some of the deficiencies that existed elsewhere in the
system. The White House knew that small business would be
opposed to the proposal because of entrepreneurial philosophies
among small businesses, an adversarial attitude toward government,
and economic fragility in that sector of the market. The bet was that
big business would come on board and would influence Congress to
support the plan.
In fact, however, big business said no to the Clinton health plan.
There were many reasons for the opposition: a philosophicalLourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
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aversion to giving government an even larger role in one-seventh of
the national economy; and in some cases, perhaps, the specific
interests of the firms represented in the councils of business
leadership.
The evidence also suggests that something else happened, which
makes this almost a turning point in health policy history. While
some of us in the center/left of the health policy debate were busy
designing a health care system that would both cover everyone and
control costs, the larger businesses in the economy were starting to
practice in health care what they were practicing in their other
business activities. They were reacting to increased competition,
both foreign and domestic, and the dramatic restructuring occurring
in their core lines of business. When businesses looked at health
care, rather than asking, “How much will our benefits cost next
year?” they began to ask, “For the following amount of money,
what are you prepared to give me? And incidentally, if you’d like
my business, why don’t you discount that amount by 10 percent.”
To say that this all occurred just in 1993 or 1994 is to ignore a
decade of growing change occurring in the American health care
system. But the healthcare marketplace came into sharper focus in
early 1994 with the rejection of the Clinton health plan by the
business community.
This new attitude by business initiated what has been called the
purchaser revolution. Seemingly overnight the power relationships
in the health care system changed. Health care providers no longer
dominated the terms of trade in the health care system. (Many
hospital administrators and physicians will take exception to my
assertion that they had been running the system. Of course there
were plenty of battles and plenty of efforts to control them. But the
bottom line is that in a period of less than 30 years spending in
health care as a percent of the gross domestic product nearly
doubled. Clearly this in part is the result of the power of providers
to influence the system.) As we went through 1993-1994 theJames R. Tallon, Jr.
5
system turned on its head: the people delivering health
care—physicians and hospitals—found themselves taking direction
from the people who were purchasing care.
The Emerging Health Care Marketplace
One result of the purchaser revolution is the unraveling of the
implicit contract under which providers assure care for everyone. In
the simplest sense, the fundamental question now is, “What will it
cost to provide services for the people for whom I am responsible
as purchaser?” Hospitals, which have largely been organized
through the 20th century as not-for-profit corporations, are seeing a
surge toward for-profit ownership and sponsorship. And the
insurance industry, previously balanced between not-for-profit and
for-profit ownership, is shifting dramatically toward for-profit
sponsorship. We are seeing a far more disciplined, purchaser-driven
marketplace that is reducing the ability of informal cost shifting to
take place. States like New York are moving to deregulate the
provision of health care. The individual professionalism and
autonomy of physicians is being challenged by the activity of Wall
Street investors, who are now acquiring and managing physician
practices. Physician practices have become a commodity in
American health care, and investors are looking at them as such.
Government is retreating from direct sponsorship and financing of
local health care services. Those elements of the safety net built
since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid are all moving toward
carrying less rather than more responsibility for the uninsured.
We are faced, therefore, with a fundamentally new dynamic in
American health care. Maybe the simplest way to characterize the
difference between a provider-driven health care system and one
that is purchaser-driven is simply to observe the following, and it
probably comes dangerously close to being a bumper sticker:Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
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# In the provider-driven system a sick person generates revenue.
In the purchaser-driven system, a sick person generates costs.
With this fundamentally different way of looking at American health
care, our previous thinking about the way public interest and
private interest interacted is changing. Government policy must
now focus on how to control a process in which market forces are
driving providers to be more cost conscious. We have a whole new
series of public policy questions to answer.
Those who have thought about American health care recognize the
underlying tension between maintenance of quality, control of cost,
and provision of access to the system. In the past we put external
controls on cost growth. We looked at quality as something to be
policed; we looked at the accreditation of institutions and at
retrospective review of patterns of care. We also provided
supplemental expansions of various kinds of public coverage built
into the existing system.
Now we are faced with a genuinely new world in which the struggle
between cost control, quality, and access is played out in this
fundamentally different environment of the marketplace. There are
new conditions:
# Paul Ellwood and George Lundberg (1996), physicians and
distinguished policy leaders in American health care, recently
declared the end of the first phase of health care reform,
concluding that costs have now largely been controlled in the
American health care system.
# In that same issue of JAMA, John Ware et al. (1996) presented
empirical evidence of adverse outcomes in managed care plans
for both the elderly and the chronically ill.James R. Tallon, Jr.
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# At the same time, Ken Thorpe (1995), the American Hospital
Association (1996), and others argue that 40 million people are
now uninsured and that the number will grow, depending on the
range of the studies, to from 45 to 67 million people by the year
2002.
# Furthermore, more than half of the uninsured population in the
country within the last year reported difficulty in actually getting
care (Donelan et al. 1996).
Those are just some of the changing dynamics of this new health
care marketplace.
Future Public Policy Issues
As we look to the future, how might one frame the public policy
debate?
Medicaid and Medicare
Medicaid is now attracting debate in Washington. Medicaid was a
primary focus of my work in Albany and with the Kaiser
Commission on the Future of Medicaid. I have spent a good deal of
time working inside what is often called “the program we love to
hate.” People tend to think of Medicaid primarily as a companion to
Medicare, both of which were adopted in 1965. Some even
described it at the time as an agreement between President Johnson
and the American Medical Association to do something with
respect to the medically indigent so that Medicare would not grow
into “socialized medicine” for all of America. Medicaid was set up
as a program to provide health insurance to poor people, and 36
million Americans currently rely on it for their health care needs.Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
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But in reality Medicaid is a multifaceted program, with four major
parts: (1) It is health insurance for poor people, mostly women and
children, because it has been linked to cash public assistance
benefits. (2) Medicaid is also the principal source of financing for
institutional care for the elderly and disabled; it pays 50 percent of
total U.S. nursing home costs. In a state like New York it pays
between 80 and 90 percent of those costs. (3) Medicaid is the
source of payment for about one in ten low-income Medicare
beneficiaries who need help to pay the premium and co-payment
costs of Medicare. (4) And Medicaid has become the principal
health care financing source for a large number of Americans with
major disabling conditions: serious and persistent mental illness,
complex physical disability, developmental disability, or chronic
illness, of which HIV infection is the most recent manifestation.
# Medicaid is the financing source for the tough problems in
American health care, problems that the rest of the system does
not want to deal with.
As Congress starts to look at Medicaid, it will be forced to look at
Medicare, which is inexorably tied to Medicaid since they are both
parts of the larger system of federally financed medical care. We
have often considered the crisis of Medicare funding as an
intergenerational issue, a smaller working population dealing with a
larger dependent population in the future. We ask, in more
personal, down-to-earth terms: How will a younger generation of
Americans care for their aging parents?
Since Medicaid is currently the principal source of financing for
chronic illness and long-term care in the country, it is important to
focus both the Medicare and the Medicaid debates into one
carefully thought out, coherent long-term policy with respect to
chronic illness.James R. Tallon, Jr.
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After the 1994 election Medicaid was discussed in terms of
devolution of power and responsibility to the states—giving the
states a block grant and allowing them to meet the needs of the
Medicaid population; and cost cutting—reducing the amount of
money but allowing a greater amount of flexibility. In December
1995 President Clinton, through his veto, rejected that course of
action and sent a welfare bill containing drastic change in Medicaid
policy back to the Congress. In the summer of 1996 the Republican
congressional leadership split welfare reform from Medicaid reform,
decided not to advance a Medicaid bill, and allowed the debate in
1996 to focus only on welfare issues.
There was and still remains tension between two alternatives for
Medicaid. The first, pushed by the leadership in Congress, is to cap
federal expenditures and give total responsibility for eligibility, for
benefits packages, and for provider reimbursement systems to the
50 individual states. The second, pushed by the White House, is to
continue a national framework with respect to Medicaid, limit the
federal government’s outlays but keep expenditure rules flexible,
and allow an upturn in federal expenditures if there is a downturn in
the economy. This would allow eligibility standards to remain
federal, with a roughly standard benefits package throughout the
nation, but with substantial state flexibility in terms of
implementation patterns, the use of managed care, and provider
reimbursement systems. I prefer the second alternative.
Whatever the terms of the debate, let me suggest that this debate
over Medicaid is critical and cannot be postponed much longer. It
will determine how we deal with some of the most complex
problems facing the American health care system, particularly as the
number of uninsured Americans grows.Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
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The Uninsured
Americans who lack health insurance coverage should also be a
major question in Washington. There is no reason to believe that
the numbers are going to get any smaller. There is nothing in the
current dynamic of health care financing in America that is going to
reduce the numbers of uninsured people. I cannot find the logic by
which a private sector economy reverses a decade-long trend in
reducing health insurance coverage and starts providing larger
amounts of health insurance to American workers. I can see debates
about avoiding reductions in Medicaid eligibility, but it is hard for
me to envision a future of massive expansion of eligibility for
Medicaid. We can debate the various trajectories by which the
number of uninsured is going to get to 65 million or 55 million or
50 million, but there is no argument that the number will get bigger
than it is now.
How do we respond? Karen Davis (1996), president of The
Commonwealth Fund in New York, wrote a thoughtful editorial in
JAMA in which she outlined the various incremental strategies with
which we could approach the issue of the uninsured in America. We
could, for example, accelerate the phase-in of the Medicaid
program for children between the ages of 12 and 18 whose incomes
are below the poverty level. Perhaps we could even take on the
“radical idea” that their parents ought to get health insurance
coverage. Maybe we could focus on children up to higher levels on
the poverty standard. Perhaps, building on Kennedy-Kassebaum,
we could focus on financing health insurance for workers in
transition in the economy. Or perhaps we could even consider the
notion of health insurance for early retirees, of whom there are
increasing numbers in the country, by letting them buy coverage
under the Medicare program. What Davis indicated is that, taken
alone or in combination, there are portions of this problem that
reasonably could fall within the resources and scope of the political
debate in Washington.James R. Tallon, Jr.
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What is most important about all this?
# Our political leaders must regain the confidence to tackle the
issues.
Clinton health care reform burned many participants in the debate,
but that great negative experience must be overcome. The growing
numbers of uninsured must bring us back to a more fundamental
debate about providing health insurance for all Americans. Most
importantly, in this emerging health care marketplace, in which the
implicit contract for providers to make health care available to all is
no longer in force, it is important that we create alternative
mechanisms for providing care to all Americans.
Rules for Managed Care
There is a third major issue before us: What are we going to do
about managed care? Managed care means many things across a
continuum of models. From discounted fee-for-service
arrangements in preferred provider organizations through tightly
controlled networks and more open point-of-service plans,
managed care carries many definitions.
Whatever the specific model, the American people, individually and
anecdotally, are talking about how they perceive managed health
care in their experience with the health care system. If there are
bubbles of discontent simmering in this system, they are in the
emerging public reaction to managed care.
There are two subset issues in managed care that have received a
lot less attention.Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
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Measuring Quality
We have been measuring the quality of health care for a generation.
But in recent years our capacity to obtain and understand data has
brought greater resources to bear on this question.
# The quality assurance debate should focus on sick people.
Many consumer satisfaction surveys have focused on the entire
population covered by managed care plans. Yet most of us buy
health insurance so that care is available when we or a member of
our family is faced with a serious illness. I do not want to diminish
the importance of illness prevention, but the core of this debate is
what happens to people who are sick. In the new health care
marketplace, sickness is equated with cost. With due respect to the
health insurance community, one of the great lessons learned is that
the best way to succeed selling health insurance is to sell it to
healthy people. The first time an individual may realize that she is
perceived according to the degree of risk she represents is when she
has a serious illness. The new set of dynamics in the health care
sector suggests that quality of service may be compromised by
concern over cost. Hence, quality measurement must focus on the
experiences of sick people, because that is the most challenging test
managed care has to meet.
Public Data to Measure Quality
When we were making public policy for a provider-driven health
care system, we operated on the assumption that those public policy
debates were based on discussion and information which was by
definition in the public realm. That does not mean that we did not
occasionally have to fight a freedom of information battle to obtain
access to information. But the underlying assumption of the law
was that information, with appropriate protections for individual
confidentiality, belonged to the public.James R. Tallon, Jr.
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As we turn to the model of the competitive marketplace, the
relationships among the players within that marketplace—those
who finance care and those who deliver it—are spelled out in
private contracts, and the terms of those contracts are presumed to
be proprietary to the contracting parties. Therefore, organizational
changes—and operational performance—are being governed by
private contracts. It may be assumed that the information in those
contracts is not in the public realm. How much of it should be in the
public realm? My preference is that a substantial amount ought to
be there.
The Role of Government
A funny thing happened on the way to smaller government: the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
popularly known as the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill. The rhetoric of
American politics was in the direction of less government, or
devolving some federal government responsibilities to the states. In
Washington, however, a bipartisan group of legislators recognized
that their constituents were experiencing practical health care
problems—the transitional insurance issues addressed in Kennedy-
Kassebaum; early discharge of maternity patients; mental health
care benefits—and undertook important initiatives at the federal
level to set standards in areas that for a generation have largely
been state responsibilities.  Setting the future rules of the game for
managed care seems to be an appropriate issue with which to begin
a thoughtful debate in Washington.
An example of practical compromises that may begin to provide the
rules of the managed care game can be found in New York.
Governor Pataki and the leadership of the New York State
Legislature have agreed, with the Managed Care Reform Act
(Chapter 705, Laws of 1996) on how to set standards for the wayLourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
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in which consumers, providers, and managed care organizations
will relate to one another.
Conclusion
There are some fairly simple observations that can be made about
the way in which public and private interest will interact in this new
health care marketplace.
First, for a marketplace economy to operate effectively in the health
care sector, rules must be adopted. Government regulations protect
us in the stock market, in our consumer transactions, and in many
other areas where the market economy works within a framework
of public rules. We need to accept the fact that, as the American
health care system changes to one in which purchasers have a far
greater amount of power, setting the rules of the game must be at
the top of the public agenda. The marketplace is likely to be more
effective, perhaps even in some respects brutally efficient, in terms
of controlling costs than our previous system, in which costs had
continued to grow. However, the health care marketplace is
different. Most people agree that health care should be available
and distributed to all. That is not a standard that Americans impose
in most other sectors of the economy. If we continue to espouse
that value, and at the same time we desire the efficiency that can be
brought about through marketplace discipline, we need to look
squarely at the risks that exist in terms of the maintenance of
quality, and of access for people who are without a payment source
in the system.
The urgent next step is to make the public decisions to guide
development of the health care marketplace so that it better serves
all of the people. In the era of smaller government, American health
care still needs a public role.James R. Tallon, Jr.
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